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Section 1. Introduction 
As reported by the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor [2002], 10.51% of the adult population 
is involved in the creation and growth of start up businesses in the United States. The rate of 
entrepreneurial activity is lower in the main trade partners of the United States: 1.81% in 
Japan, 3.2% in France, 5.16% in Germany and 5.37% in the United Kingdom. According to 
European Commission, Europe suffers from an entrepreneurship deficit in comparison to the 
US which could damage the long term growth of European countries.  The purpose of this 
paper is to challenge the link between entrepreneurship and international trade and the 
resulting welfare consequences. How to characterize psychological differences between 
managers and countries? Should European countries avoid risk and let the United States 
undertake risky innovative activities? Can free trade rectify the consequences of 
entrepreneurship deficit on countries’ welfare? 
According to De Meza and Southey [1996], an entrepreneur is a manager who overestimates 
his chance of success
1. Because entrepreneurs are optimistic, they will undertake new 
innovative activities. This definition recalls Schumpeter’s essentialist view of the 
entrepreneur according to which some (superior) people are born entrepreneurs and some are 
                                                 
1 See Landier and Thesmar [2003] for a survey of managerial and psychological literature on unrealistic 
optimism of entrepreneurs.   2
not. In this paper, we adopt the behavioural definition of Kihlstrom and Laffont [1979] for 
whom a manager becomes an entrepreneur because he has chosen the risky activity rather 
than the certain activity. 
 
Entrepreneurs can deal with both global and idiosyncratic risks. The consequences of global 
uncertainty on international trade have already been studied
2 since the pioneering work of 
Brainard and Cooper [1968]. Mayer [1976] and Sakai [1978] examine the consequences of 
price uncertainty. Helpman and Razin [1978] study the consequences of global technological 
uncertainty on the positive theorems of international trade. Newbery and Stiglitz [1984] and 
Shy [1988] relax the assumption of perfect correlation between the uncertainty in a given 
sector in each country. They show that free trade can lower the ex-ante welfare when global 
risk is negatively correlated between countries. 
We depart from these frameworks by introducing idiosyncratic risk without insurance market. 
As documented by Moskovitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002), idiosyncratic risk is a key 
feature of entrepreneurial investment leading to a great dispersion in return of private equity.  
They also point out that entrepreneurial investment is very concentrated. This lack of 
diversification is very puzzling because the return of entrepreneurship tends to be low when 
controlling for risk. 
In order to cope with both optimism and pessimism, we assume that managers misperceive 
their objective probability of success. This behaviour is well known since Kahneman and 
Tversky [1979]. In addition, Cooper, Woo and Dunkerberg [1988] reveal a great diversity of 
attitude towards risk among entrepreneurs in the United States. Some entrepreneurs are 
pessimistic e.g. 1% of them see a probability of success of 0.1 while some are optimistic e.g. 
33% see a probability of success of 1. But the population of entrepreneurs surveyed in the 
United States seems rather optimistic. In fact, 81% of entrepreneurs see a probability of 
success more than 0.7 whereas numerous studies suggest that less than 50% of businesses 
survive for more than five years. Though there exist both optimistic and pessimistic managers 
in each country, Hofstede [2001] emphasizes that countries are heterogeneous regarding their 
uncertainty avoidance. For example, the level of uncertainty avoidance is twice as much in 
Japan than in the United States.  
 
In this model, trade is grounded on cross-country differences in managers’ attitude towards 
risk. The relatively more optimistic country exports the risky commodity while the other 
country exports the certain commodity. The welfare analysis is more complicated since there 
is a need for both ex-ante and ex-post analysis according to Hammond [1981]. On the one 
hand, the ex-ante welfare analysis is useful to understand why managers will lobby in favour 
                                                 
2 See Pomery [1984] for a survey   3
or against free trade commitment. On the other hand, this decision made prior to the 
resolution of uncertainty can be regretted if the ex-post welfare analysis based on effective 
consumption leads to an opposite statement.  
 
Numerical simulations show that free trade is not always welfare improving. Ex- ante and ex-
post welfare may decrease with the opening of trade. Moreover decisions are made before the 
resolution of uncertainty that can be later regretted. In addition, the world as a whole can be 
worse off after trade when we look at effective consumption. Therefore, lump-sum transfers 
are not always sufficient to compensate trade losses. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the structure of the model. Section 3 
analyses the autarky equilibrium. Section 4 examines the free trade equilibrium and ex ante 
and ex post welfare effects. Section 5 gives economic interpretations and Section 6 studies 
economic policy implications. Section 7 concludes. 
Section 2. The model 
Consider a country J in which a continuum of managers indexed on the interval [] 1 ; 0  have to 
choose exclusively between two production project C and R. It is assumed that managers are 
totally involved in the management of their production project. In fact, Moskowitz and Vissing-
Jørgensen [2002] document that entrepreneurs and private investors face a dramatic lack of 
diversification and an extreme dispersion in returns. Project C is certain and provides one unit 
of commodity C and the wage  c w . Project R is risky since it provides one unit of commodity 
R and the wage  r w  with probability θ and 0 with probability 1-θ. Hence, risk is idiosyncratic 
to each manager’s project rather than global because aggregate uncertainty is cancelled by 
application of the law of large numbers. As quoted by Judd [1985], there are some difficulties 
with the application of the law of large numbers in a continuum. However, we follow here the 
tradition of economic literature
3 which explicitly or implicitly avoids this difficulty. 
2.1 Psychology of managers 
Despite the probability of success θ is common knowledge, we assume each manager   
[] 1 ; 0 i∈  have their own perceived probability of success denoted by  ) i ( gθ . Cooper, Woo  & 
Dunkerberg [1988] show that “the assessment by entrepreneurs of their own likelihood of 
success is dramatically detached from past macro statistics, from perceived prospects for peer 
businesses, and from characteristics typically associated with higher performing new firms.”  
                                                 
3 See the seminal works of Diamond and Dybvig [1983] or Lucas and Prescott [1974].   4
Moreover, this behaviour tends to persist because people are reluctant to reconsider their self-
image. Then it seems reasonable to assume that managers will resist to Bayesian revisions in 
order to maintain their self-confidence
4. 
Consider that managers are ranked in the continuum [ ] 1 ; 0  according to their subjective 
probability and their degree of optimism δ  which can be defined as follows: 
θ
= Ψ = δ θ
θ θ
) i ( g







; 0 . A manager i becomes optimistic if  1 ) i ( > Ψθ . Let for 
commodity of notation  δ = δθ . 
Figures 1a and 1b give an illustration of the distribution function of managers 









Figure 1a. Subjective probabilities   Figure 1b. Degrees of optimism 
Consider two managers j and k. Then, the manager j is relatively more optimistic than 
manager k if and only if  k j< : 
k j ) k ( g ) j ( g < ⇔ > θ θ  and   k j ) k ( ) j ( < ⇔ Ψ > Ψ θ θ  
δ  (resp. δ ) refers the degree of optimism of the more optimistic manager (less optimistic): 
) 0 ( θ Ψ = δ  and  ) 1 ( θ Ψ = δ . 
Example 
                                                 
4 Benabou and Tirole [2002] assume an imperfect Bayesian revision grounded on a psychological literature 
(Ross and Anderson [1977] among others). 
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Define the distribution function of subjective probabilities as  i ) i ( g + β







; 0.  
Then, the population of managers can be break down into two groups: optimistic managers 
and pessimistic ones managers. 
–  managers are optimistic whatever [ [ θ > β − ∈ θ ) j ( g , 1 ; 0 j a n d 1 ) j ( > Ψθ  
–  managers are pessimistic whatever ]] θ < β − ∈ θ ) j ( g , 1 ; 1 j a n d 1 ) j ( < Ψθ  
–  Manager V indexed by β − 1  is realist since  θ = β − θ ) 1 ( g a n d1 ) 1 ( = β − Ψθ  
2.2 Decision rule 
Managers have to choose before the resolution of uncertainty. The dual theory of choice under 
risk introduced by Yaari [1987] is useful to deal with how the perceived risk of managers is 
processed into the production choice. This is the case because the utility function defined by 
Yaari [1987] is linear in income. Consider gamble L with two outcomes. The value of the 
outcomes is (x,x) with associated objective probabilities (θ,1−θ).   
Following Yaari, the utility function of a manager i becomes: 
x ) ( g x )] ( g 1 [ ) L ( i i i θ + θ − = Ω , 
where  ) ( gi θ denotes the function of perceived probabilities by a manager i. Note that  ) ( gi θ  is 
monotonously increasing in θ with gi(0) = 0 and gi(1) = 1. Then a manager is optimistic 
(pessimistic) when  ) ( gi θ  is concave (convex). 
In this model, each manager has to choose between a certain project and a risky project which 
provides the wage  r w  with probability θ and 0 with probability 1-θ. Regarding the subjective 
probability  ) ( gi θ  of manager i, his prospect of the risky project R is: 
r i i i w ) ( g 0 )] ( g 1 [ ) R ( × θ + × θ − = Ω . 
Then, we have the following decision rule for each manager  [ ] 1 ; 0 i∈ . 
Decision rule: A manager i chooses to product risky commodity if and only if: 
c r i i i w w ) ( g ) C ( ) R ( > × θ ⇔ Ω > Ω             (1) 
The level of entrepreneurship in the economy depends on the distribution function of 
subjective probability but also on the equilibrium wage.  
Section 3. Autarky. 
3.1. The level of entrepreneurship   6
The level entrepreneurship of country J in autarky is given by  a
J n  that is the share of 
managers involved in the risky project. In fact, the manager indexed by  a n  is indifferent 













) n (     and   w ) n ( g w
θ
= Ψ = δ × =  
The degree of optimism associated with this manager is equal to the objective relative wage. 
The level of entrepreneurship in autarky is clearly equal to  a n  since more optimistic 
managers than the critical manager will choose the risky project: 
[ ] ) C ( ) R (     and    ) i ( , n ; 0 i i i
a
J
a Γ > Γ δ ≥ Ψ ∈ ∀ . 
Production of commodity R in autarky is then a
RJ
a
RJ n y θ =  
3.2. Relative price and wage in autarky 
Commodity C is the numéraire so  a
J p  refers to the autarky price of commodity R in terms of 
commodity C. After the resolution of uncertainty, managers involved in the certain activity 
receive  1 wa
CJ =  while lucky entrepreneurs earn a
J
a
RJ p w = . The relative wage in autarky is 





CJ p 1 w w = .  
Income is consumed after the resolution of uncertainty. Let  CJ d  and  RJ d  be the demand for 
commodity C and R respectively. Aggregate demand functions for the two commodities have 
unitary price and income elasticities and b denotes the share of income devoted to the 
consumption of commodity R. We have J CJ y ) b 1 ( d − =  and  p by d J RJ =  where  J y i s  t h e  







J n p ) n 1 ( y θ + − = . 















= . It depends on the objective probability θ, on the share of 
entrepreneurs and on demand conditions. 
3.3. Autarky equilibrium. 
General autarky equilibrium is reached when the risky commodity market clears. At the 
equilibrium price, the amount of risky commodity demanded by all agents equals the amount 
supplied (ex post) by managers who have chosen (ex ante) the risky process. Formally, as in 
Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979), an equilibrium is a partition { } Γ ∆, of the continuum [] 1 , 0  and a 
price p, that is a pair  { } () p , ,Γ ∆ ; for which global supply is equal to global demand of the risky 
commodity. Let  a
J n  the number of managers who are members of ∆ . We call them the   7
entrepreneurs as they will undertake the risky project. Let  a
J n 1−  the number of managers 
who are members of Γ.  
Since decision is made before the resolution of uncertainty, managers have to anticipate the 
level of earnings provided by each production project. This is possible as long as the 
distribution function of managers regarding their subjective probability is common 
knowledge. The psychological structure of the country is needed to anticipate the level of 
entrepreneurship and the equilibrium price of the risky commodity. 
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Equation (2) gives the relative wage after resolution of uncertainty. Equation (3) states that 
managers are indifferent between C and R if the expected wages delivered by each project are 
equal. The relative price of commodity R which equals global demand and global supply of 
commodity R is given by equation (4). 
Then, the level of entrepreneurship in autarky is given  ) n ( ) n ( a
J
a














= φ .  
Proof of the existence and the uniqueness of the equilibrium level of entrepreneurship are 
given in appendix A, but a diagram can help to illustrate the properties of the autarky 
equilibrium. 
3.4. Diagrammatic exposition 
Figure 2 shows how the functions  ) n ( a
J J Ψ  and  ) n ( a
J φ  determine the equilibrium allocation of 
managers in industry R.   8
 
Figure 2. Autarky equilibrium 
The autarky level of entrepreneurship  a
J n  (i.e the ranking of the critical manager) is at point 
a E  where ΨΨ  and φφ intersect. When all managers are realist like manager V, the 
equilibrium level of entrepreneurship is equal to the share of the national income devoted to 
consumption of risky commodity :  b na
J = . This benchmark helps to characterize the overall 
psychology of a country. 
Definition 1.  A country J will be J globally optimistic if the critical manager is optimistic the 
equilibrium level ( 1 a
J > δ ). Saying differently, a country will be optimistic if the equilibrium 
level of entrepreneurship is higher than b. Otherwise country J will be pessimistic. 
Figure 2 shows the case for a globally pessimistic economy since the production of risky 
commodity is inferior to b. The decision of realist manager ( ) 1 = δ  reveals the attitude towards 
risk of the country. Here, he chooses the risky project as the remuneration of the risky 
commodity is higher than the relative expected productivities:. Since the economy is globally 
pessimistic a positive risk premium  ) 0 1 a p ( > θ −  is needed to incite managers to undertake 
the risky project. On the contrary, risk premium will be negative ( 0 1 a p < θ − ) in optimistic 
countries. 
Section 4. International Trade 
Consider two countries O and P. Those countries differ only according to the 
psychological structure of managers. Country O is relatively more optimistic than country P:  
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A given entrepreneur n of country O is always more optimistic than the same entrepreneur n 
in P. For a given degree of optimism δ, the share of entrepreneurs is higher in O than in P. 
4.1. The law of comparative advantages. 
The law of comparative advantages holds and the differences in autarky prices determine the 
















O p p δ > δ ⇔ < . 
As demand conditions are identical in two countries, comparative advantages only depend on 
international differences in the psychological structure of managers. 
Proposition 1  : Country O has a comparative advantage in the production of the risky 
commodity as the critical manager is, in autarky, relatively more optimistic in country O than 
in country P. 
Figure 3. Comparative advantages 
Figure 3 illustrates proposition 1 with  P O β < β . Country O has more entrepreneurs in autarky 
than country P. Relative price of risky commodity is cheaper in O than in P before trade. 
4.2. Free Trade Equilibrium 
Under free trade, each manager knows the psychological structure of the two countries. Then, 
a manager can deduct the free trade international price of risky commodity and then he 
   a
P E  
    P δ  
  φ 
   a
O n      a
P n  
   a
O E  
     P δ  
    O δ  
   1     0 
      1 
ΨO 




  φ   10
chooses. The free trade equilibrium price is deducted from the clearing of the aggregate 
demands and the aggregate supplies of the world: 
( )θ + = * P * O * r n n y  and  ( )
*




× =  with  ( ) P. O, j        n 1 n p y * j * j * *
j = − + θ =  
Then the free trade equilibrium gives  
.
n n
n 1 n 1
) b 1 (
b
p
* P * O






As in autarky, the degree of optimism of indifferent (critical) managers  * δ  is determined.  
* P * O
* P * O *








= δ  
Free trade equilibrium exists and is unique (proof: see Appendix  B). In each country, 
relatively optimistic managers, i.e those who have a degree of optimism higher than  * δ , 
product the risky commodity. By definition, for a given degree of optimism δ, the share of 
entrepreneurs is higher in O than in P. International trade will occur. 
Proposition 2 Under free trade, the relative price of the risky commodity is between the 
relative autarky prices:  a
P
* a
O p p p ≤ ≤ . When demand conditions are identical, the relatively 
more optimistic country will specialize in the production of the risky commodity while the 
relatively pessimistic country will specialize in the production of the certain commodity. 
Proof is given in appendix C. 
Section 5. Welfare Analysis 
5.1. The need for both ex ante and ex post welfare analysis. 
As quoted by Hammond [1981, p.238], “Ex ante efficiency loses some of its 
normative appeal when consumers misperceive probabilities, or when they have inappropriate 
attitudes towards risk, or even if they are concerned about inequality of income ex post. In 
such cases, one becomes interested in different concepts of efficiency and of welfare 
optimality. These are based on a consumer’s welfare ex post. (…) The whole problem of 
uncertainty is that decisions are made that are latter regretted.” Hence, it is necessary to build 
the welfare impact of trade liberalization both on ex ante and ex post criterions as managers 
misperceive probabilities. 
Ex post analysis evaluates the level of aggregate utility after the resolution of uncertainty. It 
compares utility resulting from effective consumption under autarky and free trade. So, it is   11
not a psychological but a concrete criterion as it is grounded on what managers will 
effectively consume. 
5.2. Ex ante welfare analysis. 
5.2.1. Methodology 
The ex ante analysis compares the economy in a state of autarky under autarky to an economy 
in a state of free trade before the resolution of uncertainty. Ex ante welfare depends on the 
expected income of managers given their perception of risk.  
Regarding the demand functions depicted in section 3, the underlying expected utility 
function of a given manager i before the resolution of uncertainty is : 
()b ik b 1 b ik p y ~ E ) b 1 ( b U − − − =  with  C   , R k =  








R k for p ) ( g














R k for p ) ( g ) b 1 ( b
C k for p ) b 1 ( b
V
b 1 i b 1 b
b b 1 b
ik  
The ex ante welfare of an entrepreneur is related to his psychology. Since each entrepreneur 
has his own perception of probabilities, each manager has his own ex ante evaluation. Then, 
an aggregation problem arises and the Hicksian compensation measure of welfare is used to 
cope with this difficulty. This measure gives, for each manager, the lump-sums transfer 
required to maintain under free trade the same level of utility as in autarky. Denote Ti the 
measure of Hicksian compensation which leaves unchanged the expected utility level of 




i ik p y ~ E p T y ~ E
− − = + . 
Then, country J is better off when the sum of the compensated incomes is negative: 
0 di T T
1
0
i J < =∫ . 
5.2.1.1. The case of the pessimistic country 
Recall that the level of entrepreneurship is given by the critical manager denoted by n
a in 
autarky and n
* under free trade. It is necessary to calculate the compensated income of three 
types of managers.  
Type 1. Managers  ( ) [ ]
a * n , n min ; 0 i∈  continue to produce commodity R    12
For this partition of the continuum, the compensated income Ti is given by  
() [] () ( ) [ ] () [ ]










− − = + ⇔ = + . 
So we have  () 0 p p p i g T








These managers are worse off with trade since the relative price of commodity R is decreasing 
with the opening of trade from the pessimistic country’s point of view.  
Type 2. Managers  ( ) [ ] 1 ; n , n max i a * ∈  still produce commodity C with the opening of trade.  
For this partition of the continuum, the compensated income Ti is given by : 
() [] () []





i ik p p T 1 p y ~ E p T y ~ E
− − − − = + ⇔ = +  






i < − = . 
These managers are better off with trade due to the decrease of relative price of commodity R. 
Type 3. Managers  [ ] a * n , n i∈  abandon the risky project for the certain one: 
() [] () [] () [ ]
b a a b * i
b a ik
b * i ik p i g p p T 1 p y ~ E p T y ~ E
−
θ − − − = + ⇔ = +  
So we have,  () 1 i g p p T
b 1 a b *
i − = θ
− . 
Hence, the sum of compensated incomes for the pessimistic country is : 
() () di 1
p
p






b 1 a b *
n
0
























 − = θ
−
θ
− −  
5.2.1.2. The case of the optimistic country 
There are two differences with the pessimistic country. First the boundaries of integrals are 
different since the level of entrepreneurship increases with the opening of trade ( a * n n > ). 
Second, managers changing their production choice abandon the certain commodity for the 
risky one. 
Type 3. Managers  [ ] * a n , n i∈  abandon the certain project for the risky one: 
() [] () ( ) [ ]
b a b * i * b a ik
b * i ik p p T i g p p y ~ E p T y ~ E
− − θ
− − = + ⇔ = +  






i θ − =  
Hence, the sum of compensated incomes for the pessimistic country is :   13
() () di 1
p
p
di i g p
p
p






































 − = θ θ
− −  
5.2.2 Simulation results 
There are no analytic solutions as equations are non-linear. Hence numerical simulations of 
equilibrium and ex ante welfares are implemented with specification of countries’ 
psychological structure. Simulation 2 shows that the more pessimistic country can be worse 
off with trade for some values of parameters. On the contrary, the more optimistic country 
and the world are always better off for all the specifications tested. In particular, the results of 
two simulations among others are described below. 
 Simulation 1 
The psychological structure of managers is  n 1 3 . 0
O ) n ( + − θ = Ψ    and   
n
P n
2 1 3 . 0 ) (
+ − = Ψ θ . 
With b = 0.51 and θ = 0.45, we obtain  13 . 1 =
a
O δ , 832 . 0 =
a
P δ  and  0117 . 1
* = δ . The sum of 
the compensated incomes are  0223 . 0 di T T
1
0
iO O − = =∫ ; 0052 . 0 di T T
1
0
iP P − = =∫ ; that is 
country O and P are ex ante better off with trade. Moreover, as ∑ − =
j
W 0275 . 0 T , the world 
is better off. 
Simulation 2 
The psychological structure of managers is 
n
O n
+ − = Ψ
1 3 . 0 ) ( θ    and   
n
P n
4 . 1 1 3 . 0 ) (
+ − = Ψ θ . 
With b = 0.51 and θ = 0.45, we obtain  13 . 1 =
a
O δ ,  99 . 0 =
a
P δ  and  069 . 1
* = δ . Compensated 
incomes are  0086 . 0 TO − = ; 0028 . 0 TP = ; that is country O is better off with trade while 
country P is worse off with trade. Moreover, the world is better off since ∑ − =
j
W 0058 . 0 T . 
Summary 
The impact of free trade on ex ante welfare can be summarized in table 1 and in the following 
proposition.  
Proposition 3 When risk is idiosyncratic and managers are heterogeneous regarding their 
subjective probabilities, international trade may decrease the ex-ante welfare of the more 
pessimistic country. 
5.3  Ex post welfare analysis   14
5.3.1  The optimum level of entrepreneurship 




b b 1 a
J p y b b 1 V
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× θ × × − = −  



















× δ × θ × × − =
δ
− + −  
The collective utility function of country J depends on the psychological structure of the 
population, on demand conditions and on uncertainty. The first best optimum is reached when 
the critical manager is realist i.e when 1 a
J = δ . Then, the level of entrepreneurs is  b na = . 
Hence, we can define entrepreneurship deficit or surplus regarding the optimum level of 
entrepreneurship. 
Definition 2: At the equilibrium, the gap between the effective number of entrepreneurs and 
the optimum number of entrepreneurs is b n D a − = . The economy is facing an 
entrepreneurship deficit if D < 0 or an entrepreneurship surplus if D > 0. 
5.3.2. Simulation results 
First, it can be shown (see appendix D) that at least one country is better off with the opening 
of trade. In fact Country O (P) is always better off if the world economy is globally 
pessimistic (optimistic). Moreover, a realist country in autarky is always better off with trade. 
Numerical simulations are needed to draw more conclusions. It appears that the other country 
and the world can be worse off with trade. The Hicksian compensation method is applied to 
evaluate the aggregate welfare of the world  w T.  
Simulation 1 
The Psychological structure of the managers in country O and P are respectively : 
n
O n
+ − = Ψ
1 3 . 0 ) ( θ    and   
n
P n
+ − = Ψ
1 7 . 0 ) ( θ  
For all simulated values of parameters b and θ the world is always better off ( 0 Tw < ). 
When the world is globally optimistic ( 1 * > δ ), country P is always better off with trade. 
Country O can be either worse off or better off with trade depending on the values of 
parameters. 
– with b = 0.35 and θ = 0.45, we have  26 . 1 =
a
O δ , 96 . 0 =
a
P δ , 022 . 1
* = δ .  The impact 
of free trade on ex post welfare is  0055 . 0 − = ∆ O V  and  0072 . 0 = ∆ P V .   15
– with b = 0.43 and θ = 0.001, we obtain  12 . 2 =
a
O δ , 68 . 0 =
a
P δ  and  2 . 1
* = δ . The 
impact of free trade on ex post welfare is  0002 . 0 = ∆ O V  and  0005 . 0 = ∆ P V . 
When the world is globally pessimistic ( 1 * < δ ), country O is always better off while country 
P can be either worse off or better off according to the values of parameters: 
– with b = 0.66 and θ = 0.45, we have  02 . 1 =
a
O δ ,  78 . 0 =
a
P δ  and  89 . 0
* = δ . The impact 
of free trade on ex post welfare is  0065 . 0 = ∆ O V  and  0052 . 0 − = ∆ P V . 
– with b = 0.51 and θ = 0.45, we obtain  13 . 1 =
a
O δ , 87 . 0 =
a
P δ  and  99 . 0
* = δ . The impact 
of free trade on ex post welfare is  00115 . 0 = ∆ O V  and  00035 . 0 = ∆ P V .  
Simulation 2 
The Psychological structure of the managers in country O and P are respectively: 
n
O n
+ − = Ψ
1 5 . 0 ) ( θ    and   
1 . 0 1 5 . 0 ) (
n
P n
+ − = Ψ θ  
For some values of parameters, the world is globally pessimistic and is worse off with 
trade. With b = 0.66 and θ = 0.45 we obtain  89 . 0 =
a
O δ , 67 . 0 =
a
P δ  and  73 . 0
* = δ . The 
impact of free trade on ex post welfare is  0239 . 0 = ∆ O V ,  0257 . 0 − = ∆ P V  and  0071 . 0 Tw =  
Note that the aggregate level of entrepreneurs is decreasing:  18 . 1 22 . 1




O n n n n . 
Simulation 3 
The Psychological structure of the managers in country O and P are respectively: 
n 1 3 . 0
O ) n ( + − θ = Ψ    and   
n
P n
3 1 3 . 0 ) (
+ − = Ψ θ  
For some values of parameters, the world is globally optimistic and is worse off with 
trade. With b = 0.2 and θ = 0.45 we obtain  42 . 1 =
a
O δ ,  06 . 1 =
a
P δ  and  3 . 1
* = δ . The impact of 
free trade on ex post welfare is  0132 . 0 − = ∆ O V ,  0127 . 0 = ∆ P V  and  001 . 0 Tw = . The 
aggregate level of entrepreneurs is increasing:  4915 . 0 4711 . 0




O n n n n . 
Hence free trade can amplify the autarky distortions: when the world is globally optimistic 
(resp. pessimistic), it is nevertheless possible that the level of entrepreneurship increases 
(decreases) with trade.. 
Summary 
The impact of free trade on ex post welfare can be summarized in table 1 and in the following 
proposition.  
Table 1. The impact of free trade on ex post welfare.   16
  Country O  Country P  World 
Optimistic world  Better off / worse off  Better off  Better off / worse off 
Pessimistic world  Better off  Better off / worse off  Better off/ worse off 
Proposition 4 When risk is idiosyncratic, mutual gain from international trade doesn’t 
always exist. The impact of the opening of trade on the ex post welfare can be either positive 
or negative depending on the values of parameters. However, when the world is globally 
pessimistic (optimistic) the welfare of the more optimistic (pessimistic) country increases. 
Nevertheless, gains from trade of one country not necessarily outweigh losses from trade of 
the other: world economy can be worse off with trade. 
Section 6. Economic Interpretations and policy implications. 
6.1. Economic interpretations 
Consider the case of a globally optimistic world. As seen before, free trade always increases 
the ex-post welfare of country P. This is the case illustrated by figure 4 for some values of 
parameters: the ex-post gains from trade of country P are always positive. Country O can be 
better or worse off depending on the degree of optimism of country P. When the 
psychological distance with country P is low (Zp<2), country O is worse off. When the 
psychological distance becomes high enough (Zp>2), country O becomes better off with free 
trade. 
The ex-post welfare of country O is decreasing after trade mainly because the relative price of 
commodity R is not high enough to reward the risk taken by entrepreneurs. In this globally 
optimistic world,  * p  is lower than the equilibrium price with perfect insurance market
5. 
Therefore, the entrepreneurs receive a negative risk premium 0 1 p RP * < θ − = . With the 
opening of trade, these negative risk premiums flow in country O since the level of 
entrepreneurship is increasing
6. Of course, the risk premium is increasing in comparison to 
autarky. But, when the psychological distance is low, a slight increase of the risk premium is 
consistent with a great increase of the level of entrepreneurship in country O. 
The world can be worse off with trade too. This is the case of simulation 3 where both 
countries suffer from entrepreneurship surplus in autarky ( a
o δ  and  a
P δ  are higher than 1). 
Here, free trade increases the entrepreneurship surplus at the world level: that is 
                                                 
5 With a perfect insurance market, the equilibrium price of commodity R is equal to the ratio of expected 
productivities, that is  θ =1 p . 








O n n n n + > + . In fact, international trade can amplify the autarky distortions because 
the relative price of commodity R is not a signal of objective relative productivities but of 
biased productivities. 
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Note : Along the y-axis, ex-ante and ex-post gains from trade are given for both countries.  Along the x-axis, Zp 
is a parameter which influences the degree of optimism of country P:  a higher Zp means that country P becomes 
more pessimistic and that the psychological distance with country O increases.  The distribution functions are 
n 1 3 . 0
O ) n ( + − θ = Ψ and  n Zp 1 3 . 0
P ) n ( × + − θ = Ψ  with   45 , 0 = θ  and demand conditions are given by  51 , 0 b = . 
The ex-ante analysis can provide opposite conclusions as illustrated by figure 4. Contrary to 
the ex-post analysis, country O is now better off whereas country P is worse off. This is 
because the risk premium is now subjective and always positive for all the entrepreneurs. 
Before the resolution of uncertainty, the subjective risk premium is given by  ) ( g 1 p i
* θ −  
which is positive for all  [ ] * n , 0 i∈ . With the opening of trade, these positive risk premiums 
flow out country P since the level of entrepreneurship is decreasing.  
6.2. Trade Policy Implications 
Assume that trade policy can be grounded either on ex-post analysis or ex-ante analysis. The 
problem is that decisions are made that can be later regretted. As illustrated by figure 4, the 
ex-ante analysis and the ex-post analysis lead to opposite decisions for some values of Zp. 
Contrary to country P, country O is prone to trade before the resolution of uncertainty. But 
after the resolution of uncertainty, country O would regret this decision since effective 
consumptions are disappointing.   
Ex-ante analysis is the point of departure for the lobbying process. Before the resolution of 
uncertainty, managers can influence trade policy regarding their subjective probability. If the   18
median voter is worse off, then a trade policy is likely unless the government put a high 
weight on the ex-post aggregate welfare. 
Nevertheless, a better policy should correct the psychological bias by encouraging 
entrepreneurship in the case of an entrepreneurship deficit. One way is to deal with 
institutional or financial factors: relaxing bankruptcy laws and the access to credit can 
promote entrepreneurship. 
Section 7. Conclusion 
With an idiosyncratic risky production, international differences in psychological 
structures of managers towards risk explain the concentration of risky activities. The more 
optimistic country will specialise in the risky commodity according to the law of comparative 
advantages.  
Yet free trade is not always welfare improving. The more pessimistic country may be 
worse off either from an ex-ante or an ex-post welfare criterion. The case of the more 
optimistic country is less clear. Simulation results suggest that country O is always better off 
ex-ante whereas it can be worse off ex-post. Hence, trade liberalization is not always Pareto 
improving. Moreover, the world as a whole may be worse off when we look at effective 
consumption. Therefore, a lump sums transfer can’t always outweigh the losses from trade of 
one country. 
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Appendix 
A. Existence and Uniqueness  of Autarky Equilibrium 
In autarky, the degree of optimism of the critical entrepreneur δ
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= δ × δ . Autarky equilibrium always exists and is unique 
B. Existence and Uniqueness of Free Trade Equilibrium 
In free trade, the degree of optimism of the critical entrepreneur δ
a is determined by : 
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= δ × δ . Free trade equilibrium exists and is 
unique. 
C. Specializations under Free Trade 








O p p p δ δ δ < < ⇔ < < . 
In autarky, the degree of optimism of the critical entrepreneur of country j is given by: 




















= δ δ δ  while In free trade the degree of optimism of the 
critical entrepreneur is given by:     
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As country O is globally more optimistic than country P, we have: 
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Country O and country P then produce respectively more risky commodity and certain 
commodity than in autarky. 
D. One Country is always (ex post) Better off  with Trade. 
Consider a relatively optimistic country O and a relatively pessimistic country P. Assume that 
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Under free trade the income of the country is  ). 1 (
1
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Country J is better off with free trade if its free trade income is superior to  '
j y . This permits 
Country J to attain at least the same level of utility than in autarky.   22


















Whatever the degree of optimism of the world economy, country O and P specialize respectively 













* y y 1 < ⇒ > δ . One of both countries is then always better off 
with trade: country O is better off if the world economy is globally pessimistic, country P is 
better off if the world economy is globally optimistic. Note that a globally realist country in 
autarky ( 1 a
j = δ ) is always better off with trade: if its partner is optimistic (pessimistic) then the 
world economy is globally optimistic (pessimistic). 